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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
husband. These certificates with the attached assignment signed in blank
were in a safe deposit box in the name of the wife at the death of the hus-
band, but they had previously been in the name of the husband before he
became incapacitated. The court based its decision upon the donor's failure
to meet the statutory requirements for the transfer of title to stock certifi-
cates.6
There has been a sufficient number of fairly recent Ohio cases involv-
ing gifts and alleged gifts of personal property of considerable value to
warrant consideration by the Ohio General Assembly of legislation which
will require a certain formality, such as a written document signed by the
donor and setting forth the gift, with respect to gifts of personal property
with a value of a stated amount or more.
A husband and wife were co-owners of United States war savings bonds
which were purchased from the husband's earnings. The husband died,
survived by his wife who became the owner of them under the provisions
of the bonds and the applicable Treasury Regulations. The wife died in-
testate leaving no heirs or next of kin. The husband's sister and nephew
claimed one-half of the bonds at the death of the wife under the Ohio
half-and-half statute.7
The Ohio Court of Appeals in Lambert v. Lambert8 relied on Berberick
v. Courtade9 and held that since the wife took by contract and not by "deed
of gift," the half-and-half statute was not applicable. In the Berberick case
the Ohio Supreme Court had held that when husband and wife have a joint
bank account with right of survivorship, the survivor takes by contract and
therefore the half-and-half statute is not applicable.
ROBERT N. COOK
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Fixing Freight Rates on Single Commodities
In six cases decided Together under the heading Toledo Edison Co. v.
P.U.C.O.' -the supreme court had before it the question whether, in fixing
'In re Case's Estate, 161 Ohio St. 288, 118 N.E.2d 836 (1954).
2 OHIo REv. CODE § 4505.01 et seq.
'Peters Motors, Inc. v. Rodgers, 161 Ohio St. 480, 120 N.E. 2d 80 (1954).
'The various problems which have arisen under the Ohio Motor Vehicle Certificate
of Title Act are discussed in Note, 5 Wnsvr. REs. L. Ray. 403 (1953).
'In re Davis' Estate, 95 Ohio App. 452, 120 N.E.2d 907 (1953).
'OHIO REv. CODE § 1705.04.
7 OHIo REv. CODE S 2105.10.
'95 Ohio App. 187, 118 N.E.2d 545 (1953).
'137 Ohio St. 297, 28 N.E.2d 636 (1940).
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railroad freight rates on only a single commodity (in this instance the intra-
state transportation of bituminous coal) the Commission was required to
base such rates upon the value of the utilities' equipment used in such
transportation and upon the actual cost of such transportation. The court
ruled that it lay in the Commission's discretion to establish such single com-
modity rates without itemized inventory valuations and at a figure at vari-
ance with the actual cost. (In this instance the Commission fixed the rates
at what it found to be 92% of the cost incurred in transportation.)
The court distinguished Lindsey v. P.U.C.O,2 in which it had been held
that in fixing rate, fare, charge, toll or rental to yield a reasonable return
upon the value of the property of a public utility used and useful for the
convenience of the public, the Commission was required, under Sections
499_93 and 499-134 of the Ohio General Code to ascertain and report value
classified as in the various alphabetical subdivisions. Distinction was
made on the grounds that in the case now before the court -there was in-
volved only the freight rate on one commodity and that Section 4909.04 of
-the Ohio Revised Code,5 having been amended to read "may" where it had
formerly read "shall," confers upon the Commission a discretion in rate
fixing, insofar as valuation of property of the utility or railroad is con-
cerned.
Discrimination in Rates
While no startlingly new principles of public utility law were laid down
in the case of Buckeye Lake Chamber of Commerce v. P.U.C.O.6 it involved
the reiteration and application of three recently decided important cases.
The Ohio Central Telephone Company furnished telephone service and
operated exchanges in 46 villages and municipalities in northeastern Ohio.
It applied to the Commission for authority to increase rates and was au-
thorized to do so. The new rates had the result that inhabitants of the
Village of Hebron, who were in the same service area and on the same
"banded service rate" as the inhabitants of the nearby community of Buck-
eye Lake, received a favorable differential in monthly charges in the various
types of services. Thus, although residents of Hebron and residents of
Buckeye Lake could call each other without toll charges, or could call a
distant point at the same toll charge, the monthly -residential charge to
a user in Buckeye Lake was greater than such charge to the user in Hebron.
'161 Ohio St. 221, 118 NE.2d 531 (1954).
'111 Ohio St 6, 144 N.E. 729 (1924).
' Now OHO REv. CODE § 4909.05.4Now OMO REV. CODE § 4901.21.
Formerly OIo GEN. COD § 499-8.
'161 Ohio St. 306, 119 N.E.2d 51 (1954).
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Relying on Building Industries Exhibit, Inc. v. P.U.C.O.,7 the court
held that Sections 614-13 and 614-14, Ohio General Code,8 while requiring
charges to be just and reasonable and forbidding unlawful and unjust dif-
ferentials in rates, nevertheless permitted classification of consumers on
reasonable bases. Although Hebron and Buckeye Lake were in the same
rate area, the exchange was in Hebron, and the limited number of tele-
phones -in rural Buckeye Lake necessitated that the company bear a heavy
increased expense in the mileage of its lines to -the sparsely settled areas of
the district. The court held that "not all discrimination in rates is unjust,"
and that as there was a substantial difference in conditions as to service, the
rate differential was proper.
It was also held, following Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., v. P.U.C.O.,
that while Section 614 -46a of the Ohio General Code 10 requires the Com-
mission, in all contested cases heard by it, to file written opinions setting
forth a record of facts found by it and the reasons prompting its decisions,
,these requirements were met by its carrying into its opinion the secretary's
report wherein the uncontested facts were contained, particularly since the
protestants -had submitted no testimony contrary to the applicant's engineer-
ing and accounting reports; and, following Elyria Telephone Co. v.
P.U.C.O.,11 hat while -the Commission found that service rendered by the
applicant through certain of its exchanges was below standard, it could not
make the increases which it granted in rates conditional upon improvement
of services and facilities by the utility.
Discontinuance of Services or Facilities
Two interesting problems were presented to -the supreme court in 1954
with respect to the authorization by the Commission of the discontinuance of
services or facilities by a public utility, in both instances, railroads.
In the first case' 2 the applicant railroad, almost exclusively a freight
carrier, sought permission to abandon its two remaining daily, except Sun-
day, mixed freight and passenger trains which ran between two intermediate
points on its line. The company made money on its overall freight traffic,
and was paying dividends; maintenance of ,the passenger service 3 was
' 150 Ohio St. 251, 80 N.E.2d 836 (1948).
'Now OHIO REv. CODE §§ 4905.22 and 4905.33.
' 156 Ohio St. 360, 102 N.E.2d 842 (1951).
10 Now OHIO REv. CODE § 4903.09.
158 Ohio St. 441, 110 N.E.2d 59; see 5 WEST. REs. L. REv. 294 (1954).
"Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co. v. P.U.C.O., 161 Ohio St. 317, 119 N.E.2d 73
(1954).
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costing the road a large out-of-pocket expense. It was conceded that
freight service had been and would continue to be adequate.
The supreme court, in reversing the Commission and permitting the
railroad to discontinue all passenger service, held that under applicable
statutes' 4 "logic and reason dictate that the commission is bound to consider
only the passenger revenues and expenses in arriving at the cost of the
passenger service sought to be discontinued," and that the out-of-pocket
loss to 'the railroad, without any regard to allocation of the system-wide
cost of transportation being "unreasonably enormous,' abandonment of
passenger service should be permitted when it was also shown that 85%
of .the passengers using the train service would -have bus service available
to them. If the public demand for passenger service had been large enough
and the loss because of it less disproportionate to its cost, ,the public welfare,
said the court, might have dictated retention of the service.
In the other case' 5 the court held that the diminution of passenger train
service by applicant railroad by discontinuing a particular stop by one of
its south bound trains at one station, .there remaining still in operation
three south bound and two northbound trains which made stops there, did
not require a public hearing before the Commission, since such action by
the railroad was not, within the meaning of the applicable statutes,' 6 an
abandonment, withdrawal or closure for service of all or any part of its
tracks, depot or service. The court distinguished such cases as Cincinnati N.
R. Co. v. P.U.C.O., 7 in which the abandonment sought was of two trains
out of a larger total operated by the utility, on the ground that since both
applicant and the protestants in that case had -not raised the question
whether the Commission had power to approve or disapprove a partial
abandonment of service, the decision and any statements therein which
might have so indicated actually did not so determine.
Rate Bases
The case of City of Cincinnati v. P.U.C.O,'8 involved the -propriety of
the allowance by ithe Commission of the inclusion of certain items in the
recurring expenses of the Cincinnati and Suburban Telephone Company as a
basis of revenue required by it in order to determine a proper rate structure.
Again, while announcing no new principles of the establishment of rate
"The area served was almost exclusively rural, and, in fact, the trains were known as
the "Sassafras Specials."
"OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4905.20 and 4905.21.
" In re New York Central Train No. 421, 161 Ohio St. 332, 119 N.E.2d 77 (1954).
'
0 Ouso REv. CODE S§ 4905.20 and 4905.21.
"119 Ohio St. 568, 165 N.E. 38 (1929).
161 Ohio St. 395, 119 N.E.2d 619 (1954).
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basis, the court either distinguished the situation -before it from recently
decided cases, or reiterated principles announced in other recent decisions.
The inclusion in a rate base structure of amounts of federal excess profits
taxes which the utility could be expected 'to have to pay was upheld in a
1950 case.19 In that case, however, -there had been no objection at the hear-
ing before the Commission to the inclusion of this item, while in the 1954
case the inclusion had been permitted by the Commission over such objec-
rtions. Furthermore, the court pointed out, dn the 1954 case at the time of
,the "day certain" involved in the hearings, the company's earnings under
the rates then in effect did not require it to pay any excess profits tax, and
while the increases in rates allowed by the Commission could be expected
-to bring about an obligation to pay some excess profits taxes, -the expected
expiration of the tax statute on June 30, 1953 (it was eventually extended
to December 31, 1953) precluded the inclusion of this item in the rate base
structure as a recurring expense. Rather, it should have been disallowed
or amortized over a reasonable period.2 0
Likewise the utility had been, since 1945, amortizing over a 10-year
period, an "unfunded actuarial reserve" deficiency in its employees' pen-
sion fund.2' This deficiency was expected to be completely amortized by
1954, by which time the actuarial reserve would be completely funded. The
inclusion by the Commission of the amounts -remaining unpaid, in the rate
bases was, therefore, said the court, not proper as a recurring expense. It
permitted, of course, the current payments to such fund.
Finally, the court also reversed the Commission's decision that there
need not be deducted from the rate base structure certain accruals, such as
customers' deposits, advance billings and payments and accrued taxes pay-
able by customers and collected by the company. The court held that these
figures remained fairly constant monthly, that the company actually had
a substantial use of them for working capital purposes after their collection
and prior to their payment by the utility, and -that they must therefore be
used to offset the rate base allowance for working capital, including the
investment in materials and supplies for normal operations and for plant
maintenance and repair.
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
" City of Cincinnati v. P.U.C.O., 153 Ohio St. 56, 90 NYE.2d 681 (1950).
' Citing Hardin-Wyandot Lighting Co. v. P.U.C.O., 108 Ohio St. 207, 215, 140
N.E. 779 (1923) and East Ohio Gas Co. v. P.U.C.O., 133 Ohio St. 212, 226, 12
NE.2d 765, 773 (1938).
'The deficiency was caused by the fact that the utility had, from 1913 to 1927, paid
pensions on a pay-as-you-go basis, and by the further fact that from 1927 until 1945
the rates adopted by the company for reserve fund payments had been actually in-
sufficient.
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